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INTRODUCTION 
At the time this article was written, in June 2020, the United States was five 
months into the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. The United States Supreme Court, in 
a divided decision,' has turned away a challenge to state authority to impose gen-
eral public health restrictions that did not exempt religious institutions. While 
most state and federal courts have also rejected challenges to public health orders, 
an unprecedented number of courts have sided with the challengers and substi-
tuted the courts' judgment on public health safety measures for that of the state or 
local public authorities. At this point in time, support for public health restrictions 
to slow the spread of the virus tends to follow the existing ideological divide in 
the country, reflecting either the President's skepticism of science and expert 
opinion and downplaying the risk of the pandemic, or accepting the need for dra-
matic shared sacrifice in the face of grave danger. 
This article is a historical look at the judicial review of public health orders and 
statutes. Courts have almost always deferred to the judgment of public health 
authorities or legislatures in public health cases. In only two cases has the 
Supreme Court found such actions unconstitutional.2 In both, the Court found 
* Edward P. Richards is the Director of the LSU Law Center Climate Change Law and Policy 
Project, Clarence W. Edwards Professor of Law, and holder of the Edward J. Womac, Jr. Endowed 
Professorship in Energy Law at the Louisiana State University Law Center. © 2020, Edward P. 
Richards. 
1. South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613 (2020) (mem.). 
2. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
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that the proffered public health justification was pretextual, with a significant 
racial/ethnic bias. 
But while the judicial divide over the public health response to COVID-19 is 
unprecedented, the public controversy is not. Public health actions have always 
been controversial in the United States. There have always been vaccine resisters. 
Businesses resist anything that interferes with their operations. Individuals resist 
restrictions on personal behavior, whether that was wearing masks in 1918-1919 
or being isolated for tuberculosis. Public officials also have sometimes failed to 
act because of public opposition. Public resistance to disease control measures 
during the 1918-1919 flu pandemic, for example, led to a second wave of cases 
and a dramatic increase in deaths.3 And political opposition to public health 
actions greatly exacerbated the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the United 
States. 
I. PLAGUES IN THE PAST 
Infectious disease has shaped society from the earliest days. Infection made 
even minor injuries potentially fatal. When society shifted from small hunter 
gatherer groups to permanent farming communities, the increased population 
density provided a niche for diseases uch as smallpox, which only spread among 
humans. Unsanitary food could sicken or kill individuals or an entire community 
if shared at a feast. Even if the fatality rate for a disease was not high in isolated 
cases, an epidemic could decimate a community, because simultaneous illness 
destroyed societal support systems: there would be no one who could prepare 
food or go for water. The classic book, Rats, Lice andHistory, provides a graphic 
view of this world: 
In earlier ages, pestilences were mysterious visitations, expressions of the 
wrath of higher powers which came out of a dark nowhere, pitiless, dreadful, 
and inescapable. In their terror and ignorance, men did the very things which 
increased death rates and aggravated calamity. . . . Panic bred social and moral 
disorganization; farms were abandoned, and there was shortage of food; fam-
ine led to . . . civil war, and, in some instances, to fanatical religious move-
ments which contributed to profound spiritual and political transformations.4 
As an invisible threat that could destroy a tribe or a civilization, disease was a 
natural focus of religion. Religious taboos provided the first public health codes. 
In the Judeo-Christian tradition, public health law starts in Genesis: "But of the 
tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that 
thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." 5 Leviticus provides is a more detailed 
3. Brian Dolan, Unmasking History: Who Was Behind the Anti-Mask League Protests During the 
1918 Influenza Epidemicin San Francisco,PERSPECTIVES IN MED. HUMANITIES (May 19, 2020). 
4. HANS ZINSSER, RATS, LICE AND HISTORY 129 (Classics of Med. Libr. 1997) (1935). 
5. Genesis 2:17. 
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public health code.6 The Romans developed the discipline of sanitary engineer-
ing, building water works and sewers.7 The growth of shipping and merchant 
nations such as Venice in the 1300s lead to the development of quarantine-hold-
ing potentially disease-carrying ships and their passengers offshore for 40 days.8 
The English statutory and common law, which was carried into the colonies, 
recognized the right of the state to quarantine and limit the movement of plague 
carriers. (Plague in this period was a more general term than the specific disease 
indicated by plague today.) Blackstone observed that disobeying quarantine 
orders merited severe punishments, including death.9 These penalties recognized 
the severity of the threat that plagues posed to the community. In Plagues and 
Peoples, the historian William H. McNeill documented this threat by showing the 
role of epidemic communicable diseases in destabilizing the feudal order in 
Europe and in the destruction of indigenous peoples by European invaders. 10 This 
is Blackstone's description of British law on quarantine and the penalties for 
violators: 
The fourth species of offenses, more especially affecting the commonwealth, 
are such as are against the public health of the nation; a concern of the highest 
importance, and for the preservation of which there are in many countries spe-
cial magistrates or curators appointed. 
1. The first of these offenses is a felony ... that if any person infected with the 
plague, or dwelling in any infected house, be commanded by the mayor or 
constable, or other head officer of his town or vill, to keep his house, and 
shall venture to disobey it; he may be enforced . . . to obey such necessary 
command: and, if any hurt ensue by such enforcement, the watchmen are 
thereby indemnified. And further, if such person so commanded to confine 
himself goes abroad, and converses in company, if he has no plague sore 
upon him, he shall be punished as a vagabond by whipping, and be bound to 
his good behavior: but, if he has any infectious sore upon him uncured, he 
then shall be guilty of felony.... [T]he method of performing quarentine, or 
forty days probation, by ships coming from infected countries, is put in a 
much more regular and effectual order than formerly; and masters of ships, 
coming from infected places and disobeying the directions there given, or 
having the plague on board and concealing it, are guilty of felony without 
benefit of clergy. The same penalty also attends persons escaping from the 
lazarets, or places wherein quarentine is to be performed; and officers and 
6. See Leviticus 11-16. 
7. CHARLES FREDERICK BOLDUAN & NILS W. BOLDUAN, PUBLIC HEALTH AND HYGIENE 4 (1941). 
8. The word "quarantine" derives from quadraginta,meaning 40. It was first used between 1377 and 
1403 when Venice and the other chief maritime cities of the Mediterranean adopted and enforced a 40-
day detention for all vessels entering their ports. Id. at 7. 
9. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *161-62. 
10. WILLIAM H. MCNEILL, PLAGUES AND PEOPLES (1998). 
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watchmen neglecting their duty; and persons conveying oods or letters from 
ships performing quarentine." 
The British system included the authorization for executive orders by local offi-
cials to impose disease control measures. This legal framework was carried to the 
British colonies in North America. 
II. EPIDEMIC DISEASE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES 
Colonial public health law was shaped by Blackstone and by the local experi-
ence. Most colonial cities were built on waterways or along coastlines because 
trade traveled by water. These coastal areas were surrounded by marshes and wet-
lands, subjecting the colonies to mosquito-borne illnesses-yellow fever and 
malaria-as well as water-borne illnesses-typhoid and cholera-driven by poor 
drinking water sanitation." Smallpox made regular appearances in colonial cities, 
as did other epidemic diseases, and tuberculosis (consumption) was a constant 
companion.13 The first demographic study of life expectancy in the United States, 
The Shattuck Report, was done in Massachusetts in the late 1840s. This study 
showed that the life expectancy of a person living in Boston was 27.85 years 
between 1810 and 1820, and that it declined to 21.43 years between 1840 and 
1845, as the city became more populous.14 The primary cause of premature death 
was communicable disease. 
Yellow fever or "yellow jack," as it was known at the time, was especially 
deadly. It is a mosquito-borne illness brought to the Americas from Africa 
through the slave trade. The first outbreak was in Yucatin in 1648. It was brought 
to Boston in 1693. It spread through the colonies and began yearly outbreaks, 
building in the summer and fall and disappearing during the winter along with the 
mosquitoes. Ten percent of the population of Philadelphia died of yellow fever 
between September and November 1793, leading to panic and a breakdown in 
civil order." The flavor of that period was later captured in an argument before 
the Supreme Court: 
For ten years prior, the yellow-fever had raged almost annually in the city, and 
annual laws were passed to resist it. The wit of man was exhausted, but in 
vain. Never did the pestilence rage more violently than in the summer of 1798. 
11. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *161-62. 
12. See Alex Kreit & Aaron Marcus, Raich, Health Care, and the Commerce Clause, 31 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 957, 983 (2005) (noting that epidemics such as smallpox, yellow fever, typhoid, and 
malaria swept the East Coast during the early nineteenth century). 
13. See id. at983. 
14. LEMUEL SHATTUCK ET AL., REPORT OF THE SANITARY COMMISSION OF MASSACHUSETTS 1850 
(1948), at 104. 
15. JOHN H. POWELL, BRING OUT YOUR DEAD: THE GREAT PLAGUE OF YELLOW FEVER IN 
PHILADELPHIA IN 1793, at vi, 242-47, 282 (1949) (explaining that in 1793, 5,000 of Philadelphia's 
55,000 inhabitants died of yellow fever, compelling the Assistant Committee to take Draconian 
measures to mount "resistance to disaster"). 
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The State was in despair. The rising hopes of the metropolis began to fade. 
The opinion was gaining ground, that the cause of this annual disease was in-
digenous, and that all precautions against its importation were useless. But the 
leading spirits of that day were unwilling to give up the city without a final des-
perate effort. The havoc in the summer of 1798 is represented as terrific. The 
whole country was roused. A cordon sanitairewas thrown around the city. 
Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania proclaimed a non-intercourse between New 
York and Philadelphia. 16 
The impact of infectious diseases on the colonies is key to understanding the 
deference judges showed to legislatures and public health authorities in their 
efforts to control epidemics. Yellow fever provided a clear example of the break-
down of civil society that most frightened governments. The broad authority and 
severe penalties described in Blackstone arose from this fear of social disorder, 
not just the concern for loss of life. When colonial governments were faced with 
yellow fever and other outbreaks, they did not hesitate to use the full powers of 
the state to try to control the contagion. The Framers of the Constitution were fa-
miliar with the public health powers exercised by the colonial governments and 
the states under the Articles of Confederation. While it was not a great epidemic 
year, yellow fever in Philadelphia during the Constitutional Convention reminded 
the Framers of the threat that epidemic disease posed to the new nation. The 
powers of the state to protect public health thus can probably claim strong origi-
nal intent. 
III. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW AT THE TIME OF THE DRAFTING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
At the time of the framing of the Constitution, state governments and, more 
importantly, the governments of major cities had a long history of public health 
statutes and regulations passed in response to waves of deadly epidemic disease 
dating back to the earliest colonial days." These were based on the jurispruden-
tial principle of a state's police powers. As analyzed in Justice Cooley's classic 
work, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the 
Legislative Powerof the States of the American Union, they represent he funda-
mental power of a state to protect its people: 
Blackstone defines the public police and economy as "the due regulation and 
domestic order of the kingdom, whereby the inhabitants of a State, like mem-
bers of a well-governed family, are bound to conform their general behavior to 
the rules of propriety, good neighborhood, and good manners, and to be 
decent, industrious, and inoffensive in their respective stations." Jeremy 
Bentham, in his General View of Public Offences, has this definition: "Police 
is in general a system of precaution, either for the prevention of crimes or of 
16. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 340-41 (1849). 
17. For example, epidemic disease was a major factor in the failure of the Jamestown Colony. See 
Karen Ordahl Kupperman, Apathy andDeathin EarlyJamestown, 66 J. AM. HisT. 24 (1979). 
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calamities. Its business may be distributed into eight distinct branches: 1. 
Police for the prevention of offences; 2. Police for the prevention of calami-
ties; 3. Police for the prevention of endemic diseases; 4. Police of charity; 5. 
Police of interior communications; 6. Police of public amusements; 7. Police 
for recent intelligence; 8. Police for registration."1" 
These broad powers push back against traditional property rights. (Bentham's 
eight branches of policing seem very modern, with the current calls for restructur-
ing the police.) Colonial regulations covered the gamut of traditional public 
health-abatement of nuisances, quarantine for communicable diseases, and reg-
ulation of the sale of food and drink.19 In Boston, for example, statutes and regu-
lations to control smallpox outbreaks were in place before 1721.20 
Quarantine was strictly enforced. One of Paul Revere's children was infected 
during the smallpox epidemic of 1764. Under the public health ordinances, she 
would have had to be moved to the pesthouse, or the entire family would be quar-
antined. Out of concern for her well-being, Revere refused to allow her to be 
taken to the pesthouse. 21 He and his family were therefore confined in their house 
for the duration of the infection. During this period (more than a month), a quar-
antine flag was hung in front of the house, and a guard was posted to keep the 
Reveres in and others away from the house.2 2 
The historical record shows that he police powers were well developed in the 
states at the time of the framing of the Constitution. Looking back from our cur-
rent period, it is critical to distinguish these police powers, which provided the 
understanding of police powers for the Framers, from the powers of contempo-
rary police forces. During the colonial period, police as we know them today did 
not exist: 
Police are relative newcomers to the Anglo-American criminal justice system. 
The Constitution does not mention them. Early city charters do not mention 
them, either, for the simple reason that, as we know them, police had not been 
invented. Instead, cities had loosely organized night watches and constables 
who worked for the courts, supplemented by the private prosecution of 
offenders through lower-level courts. The night watch and day constable, dat-
ing from the Middle Ages, were familiar comic figures in Shakespeare's plays 
and were not replaced until the 1820s, when London police were reorganized 
by Robert Peel. The police precedent for the United States, as is well known, 
came from the establishment of the Metropolitan Police of London in 1829. 
18. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 572 n.1 (2d ed. 1871) (citations omitted). 
19. Wendy E. Parmet, Health Careand the Constitution:PublicHealth and the Role of the State in 
the Framing Era, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 267, 285-302 (1992). 
20. John B. Blake, Smallpox Inoculationin ColonialBoston, 8 J. HIST. OF MED. & ALLIED SCIENCES 
284 (1953). 
21. See Kirk v. Wyman, 83 S.C. 372, 65 S.E. 387, 388 (1909) (pesthouse described as "coarse and 
comfortless ... adjoin[ing] the city dumping grounds"). 
22. ESTHER FORBES, PAUL REVERE AND THE WORLD HE LIVED IN 76-77 (1942). 
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Peel used his military experience in Ireland to create a social control organiza-
tion midway between a military and a civil force. 
The modern police force corresponds to Bentham's police to prevent offen-
ces." It exercises police powers not yet developed at the time of the drafting of 
the Constitution. In the traditional view of federalism, the Constitution leaves the 
police powers to the states." These are the Blackstone/Bentham police powers, 
which were primarily public health powers as implemented by the colonies at the 
time of the Constitution. If there is any proposition about which the original intent 
of the Framers is clear, it is that the states have broad powers over public health 
and safety, and that the federal role should be secondary to that of the states: 
Every state has acknowledged power to pass, and enforce quarantine, health, 
and inspection laws, to prevent the introduction of disease, pestilence, or 
unwholesome provisions; such laws interfere with no powers of Congress or 
treaty stipulations; they relate to internal police, and are subjects of domestic 
regulation within each state, over which no authority can be exercised by any 
power under the Constitution, save by requiring the consent of Congress to the 
imposition of duties on exports and imports, and their payment into the treas-
ury of the United States.26 
IV. THE POST-CONSTITUTION PUBLIC HEALTH CASES 
The judicial decisions in public health cases after ratification of the Constitution 
reflect this understanding of states' police powers. Almost all the cases review state 
actions, because, with few exceptions, the federal government until fairly recently 
left public health measures to the states. When those state measures reflected the 
broad understanding of police powers at the end of the eighteenth century, the courts 
upheld them. The courts struck down state actions, however, when they interfered 
with fundamental constitutional interests, as when they interfered with interstate 
commerce or were used as a pretense for acial discrimination. 
Three basic questions are addressed in these cases. First, has the state exceeded 
the scope of its police powers? Second, does the state's exercise of its police 
power interfere with a constitutionally protected interest, or conflict with a federal 
law? Third, has the state properly implemented the action through legislation or 
executive action? 
In the early cases, the question was usually whether the state action interfered 
with interstate commerce. Later cases, such as the vaccine cases and the personal 
restriction cases, were based on the violation of individual rights. The Constitution 
is silent on how government will function on a day-to-day basis, that is, it is silent 
23. Eric H. Monkkonen, History of UrbanPolice, 15 CRIME & JUST. 547, 549 (1992). 
24. COOLEY, supranote 18, at 572. 
25. Id. 
26. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540,616 (1840). 
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on administrative law. As the courts decided these cases on the implementation of 
the police powers, they also established part of the framework for modern admin-
istrative law. 
These cases addressed conflicts between federal and state power. The Framers 
did not contemplate the size and complexity of the contemporary federal govern-
ment. The president was given broad national security powers to deal with exter-
nal threats, and Congress was given the power to regulate interstate commerce. 
While the Commerce Clause has become the major source of congressional 
power, the Framers saw it as giving the federal government the power to prevent 
trade wars among the states-the using of state police and taxing powers to disad-
vantage out of state businesses and favor local businesses. 
V. GIBBONS V. OGDEN: DO POLICE POWERS SURVIVE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE? 
The key early case in federal judicial review of state police powers is Gibbons 
v. Ogden, which was decided in 1824." New York State had passed a law requir-
ing permits for steamships to sail to New York ports and on New York water-
ways. The permits were intended to generate revenue and to allow the state to 
limit and regulate steamships. The permits were limited, however, creating a 
monopoly for their holders. Ogden had a New York permit, and Gibbons did not. 
Ogden sought an injunction in the New York courts to prevent Gibbons from 
operation steamboats in New York waters. When the New York court ruled for 
Ogden, Gibbons appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Gibbons argued, through his attorney Daniel Webster, with support from the 
Attorney General, that his federal permit, issued pursuant to a congressional stat-
ute, preempted the state's authority to bar him from New York waters. The case 
raised what were then novel questions of the definition of commerce, the effect of 
the supremacy clause, and the extent of federal control of navigable waters. All 
the questions were decided in favor of federal power and are now foundational 
constitutional law. 
The important police power question was the extent to which state police 
powers survive when they overlap with the federal power to regulate commerce. 
The arguments of counsel are included with the opinion in the official reporters. 
They provide an extensive review of existing state police power regulations 
directed at disease control, food sanitation, and other areas where there was a 
potential conflict with the federal power to regulate commerce. The Court was 
clear that the powers may coexist to the extent that Congress has not specifically 
spoken and reserved an area for federal control. The Court gave the example of 
federal statutes supporting state quarantine laws. 28 It pointed out that while New 
York did not have the power to restrict commerce on navigable waters, it could 
27. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
28. Id. at 205. 
2020] A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE STATE POLICE POWERS 91 
regulate and inspect cargos to prevent threats to the public health. This might 
include a quarantine or the destruction of contaminated cargo.29 
Gibbons v. Ogden established the supremacy of federal law when Congress 
has specifically spoken, and it established that the federal government broadly 
regulates commerce. The state public health laws were coextensive with this 
power, the Court said, and the states could take action that would affect com-
merce as long as it was done for proper police power reasons. The states fre-
quently used health and safety concerns to justify more stringent regulation of 
state businesses, however. The result was a line of cases distinguishing good faith 
public health actions from improper restrictions on interstate commerce, and 
establishing a general principle that barred discrimination against interstate 
commerce. 
VI. THE QUARANTINE CASES 
Smith v. Turner, cited earlier for its descriptive history of yellow fever in the 
United States, is one of a pair of cases contesting state taxes on ships from foreign 
ports. The tax was a head tax on all passengers from a foreign port, and it was to 
be paid by the master of the ship. Smith was master of a ship contesting the tax as 
exacted by New York, and Norris was contesting the tax imposed by the City of 
Boston. 30 The tax was used to pay for the operation of the state-run quarantine 
station at each port.31 In supporting the right of states to tax and control entry at 
their ports, the attorneys for the states remind us that state police powers were of-
ten put to racist and xenophobic ends: 
We entertain no doubt whatever that the States, in virtue of their general police 
power, possess full jurisdiction to arrest and restore runaway slaves, and 
remove them from their borders, and otherwise to secure themselves against 
their depredations and evil example, as they certainly may do in cases of idlers, 
vagabonds, and paupers.... 
... We think it competent and as necessary for a State to provide precautionary 
measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possibly 
convicts, as it is to guard against physical pestilence, which may arise from 
unsound and infectious articles imported, or from a ship, the crew of which 
may be laboring under an infectious disease." 
The Court discussed in detail the use of the state's police powers to protect the 
public health.33 As in Gibbons, it addressed a federal statute as well as the federal 
government's constitutional power over commerce and foreign relations. 
29. Id. at203. 
30. Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 298-300 (1849). 
31. Id. at 403. 
32. Id. at 329-330 (citations omitted). 
33. Id. at 329-36. 
92 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAw & POLICY [Vol. 11:83 
Congress had established quarantine hospitals, a rare example of early direct fed-
eral public health efforts, and had limited state control over foreign goods and 
passengers.34 While the Court recognized the preeminence of state law in quaran-
tine and communicable disease control, it found that the federal government's 
right to regulate international commerce trumped the states' power to tax foreign 
travelers, even if this tax supported public health measures.3 5 
In Railroad Co. v. Husen, the Court considered a Missouri statute that was 
intended to prevent the spread of disease by cattle transported though the state.36 
Diseased farm animals pose a risk to the humans who eat or work with them, but 
they also pose an economic risk to the farming community. Until universal pasteuri-
zation of milk was required, milk from diseased cows was a major vector for human 
tuberculosis. The introduction of diseased livestock into a community may then 
require that all the livestock in the community be destroyed to control further spread 
of the disease. The state is not required to pay compensation for the livestock 
because they constitute a public nuisance under the Takings Clause. Thus, the state 
has a strong interest in preventing the importation of diseased livestock. 
The Missouri law at issue prohibited the importation into the state of Texas, 
Mexican, or Indian (likely meaning from the Indian Territory) cattle from the first 
day of March until the first day of November. The railroad was allowed to trans-
port cattle through the state if they were not unloaded, but the railroad was liable 
if infection broke out along the transportation route.37 The plaintiffs argued that 
the law was overbroad, because it created a presumption that if any diseased cat-
tle were found along the transportation route, the shipping companies were re-
sponsible if they had shipped any cattle.38 Plaintiffs claimed that this effectively 
banned the shipping of all cattle through Missouri from March through October, 
and thus it violated the Interstate Commerce Clause.39 
The Husen Court reiterated the broad powers of the state to impose quarantines 
and to prohibit the transportation and sale of diseased livestock and other goods, 
even if these actions interfered with commerce. But the Court found that the 
Missouri law was not a valid inspection or quarantine law, because it created a 
blanket ban on shipping into the state and potential liability for shipping through 
the state. It was set by the calendar, rather than being triggered by the detection of 
disease. There was no inspection to determine whether diseased livestock were 
being transported. The Court found that to survive the presumption against laws 
that interfere with interstate commerce, a law must be narrowly tailored to specif-
ically target diseased livestock.40 
34. Id. at424-25. 
35. Id. at 414-17. 
36. 95 U.S. 465,468-69 (1877). 
37. See id. at 469. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 466-67. 
40. Id. at 472-73. 
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The Court returned to the question of quarantine station fees in 1886 in 
Morgan's Steamship Company, a case challenging fees charged ships by the 
quarantine stations of the City of New Orleans.41 At the time, New Orleans was 
still one of the largest cities and ports in the United States. As the Court noted, the 
city's position on the Gulf of Mexico made it the prime entry point for ships from 
tropical countries bringing diseases of warm climes, as well as for international 
shipping that brought more general disease threats.42 
The Louisiana quarantine station statute set out a fee schedule based on the 
type of boat or ship, and the fee was assessed against all vessels, both domestic 
and foreign. The fees were directly related to services provided by the quarantine 
station, which included inspection of the ship, and quarantine and fumigation if 
necessary. Each ship's master benefited from this system, both because it pro-
vided services that he would otherwise have to provide, and because if the ship 
were found to be disease free, he would get a clean bill of health and be allowed 
to continue to his destination.43 
The Court reviewed the federal quarantine statute discussed in Smith and found 
that it did not displace the state's right to run quarantine stations, and that the fed-
eral government depended on state quarantine stations. The Court asked whether 
the fees were applied in a way that discriminated against interstate or foreign 
commerce. It concluded that because the fees were applied uniformly to all ves-
sels and were used to provide legitimate quarantine services, they did not violate 
the Constitution.4 
The next important quarantine case, in 1900, raised a question important oday: 
whether a state may bar or restrict the entry of citizens of another state to prevent 
the spread of disease? While the quarantine stations and public health hospitals 
are now gone, the differential spread of COVID-19 has caused some states to 
impose restrictions on travel into those states by residents of other states. This 
was the question in Louisianav. Texas: could Texas bar entry by people traveling 
from New Orleans? 45 
In 1895, the Texas legislature passed a law authorizing the governor and/or the 
state health officer to establish quarantines to protect the residents of the state 
from communicable diseases. In 1899, when a case of yellow fever (whose mode 
of transmission was still unknown) was reported in New Orleans, the health offi-
cer embargoed all commerce between New Orleans and Texas.46 The original 
order included the U.S. mail. It was then modified to allow the mail, and to allow 
people to enter the state if they spent 10 days at the state quarantine station and 
41. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co. v. Bd. of Health of State of Louisiana, 118 U.S. 455 
(1886). 
42. Id. at 459-460. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. at 467. 
45. Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900). 
46. Id. at 4. 
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allowed their luggage to be fumigated. No goods from New Orleans were allowed 
into Texas, without regard for their identity or relation to disease transmission. 
Plaintiffs argued that his embargo was a subterfuge intended to hurt businesses 
in New Orleans, which was the dominant commercial center in the South and a 
major competitor of the Port of Galveston. Plaintiffs also insisted that, as in 
RailroadCo. v. Husen, the order was not tailored to any disease threat but was an 
unjustifiable blanket prohibition on commerce. They put on evidence showing 
that the health officers of several similarly situated southern states had agreed on 
a protocol for yellow fever travel restrictions, and that the Texas order did not fol-
low this protocol. 
While the claim might have been brought by business interests in New 
Orleans, it was instituted instead by the State of Louisiana, invoking the Supreme 
Court's original jurisdiction. But the Court was concerned that original jurisdic-
tion was limited to claims by a state on its own behalf, such as disputes over trans-
boundary waters. In this case, the state was acting in its role as parenspatriae, 
litigating on behalf of New Orleans businesses injured by the embargo. 
The Court ultimately held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the case, but 
it provided dicta that indicate how it might have ruled.47 The court repeated the 
language of prior cases stating that state quarantine and embargo powers survive 
to the extent that they are not in conflict with a federal law. But if a state seeks to 
impose a substantial restriction on interstate or international commerce, it must 
be applied in a nondiscriminatory way and only to the extent necessary to control 
a specific disease outbreak. Texas's blanket ban, like the one in Husen, would 
likely have failed because it was not meaningfully linked to the threat of yellow 
fever from New Orleans. 
The Court was not finished with New Orleans. The last of the quarantine cases, 
Compagnie Frangaisede Navigation a Vapeur v. Bd. of Health of State of 
Louisiana, addressed the use of a cordon sanitaire-aban on travel into as well 
as out of a quarantined area.48 Plaintiff was a French shipping company that trans-
ported cargo and passengers. Its ship, S.S. Britannia,stopped at the New Orleans 
quarantine station at issue in Morgan Steamship Company and was inspected by 
the station's health officer. It was given a clean bill of health, which permitted it 
to dock in New Orleans or upriver ports on the Mississippi. Before it could dock, 
however, it was served with an order from the Louisiana State Board of Health 
forbidding it to dock in New Orleans or other ports in the region. The ship was 
ultimately forced to disembark its passengers in Pensacola, Florida, and then 
return to Louisiana to discharge its cargo. The shipowner then sued the Board of 
Health and its members for damages representing the excess costs caused by the 
delay and rerouting of the vessel. 
The plaintiff attacked the Board's order as an unwarranted restraint of interstate 
and international commerce, and as a violation of a treaty preventing discrimination 
47. Id. at22. 
48. 186 U.S. 380 (1902). 
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against French shipping. It argued that since the ship had a clean bill of health, it 
should not have been subjected to further public health restrictions. 
The Court looked at the 1799 federal quarantine law discussed in the earlier 
police power cases and at its revision through time. None of these revisions dis-
placed the state's quarantine power, the Court found, and the most recent revi-
sions clearly indicated that federal agents should assist with a state quarantine.49 
Having determined that Congress had not displaced the state's quarantine power, 
and that the Board of Health's action was properly grounded in Louisiana law, 
the Court then turned to the rationale for allowing state quarantine law to interfere 
with interstate and international commerce. Counsel for the Board argued, with 
support from older cases, that this was not a question of commerce at all: 
Turning now to the decisions of this court, it will be found that the basis upon 
which it has upheld the exclusion, inspection, and quarantine laws of various 
states, is that criminals, diseased persons and things, and paupers, are not legit-
imate subjects of commerce. They may be attendant evils, but they are not 
legitimate subjects of traffic and transportation, and therefore, in their exclu-
sion or detention, the state is not interfering with legitimate commerce, which 
0is the only kind entitled to the protection of the Constitution.5 
The Court recognized that this formulation was apt in the case of products that 
are completely banned. According to the Court, however, it provided no stand-
ards when the question was testing the state's action to balance public health pro-
tection with the constitutional right of interstate and international commerce. If 
something could be renderedoutside of commerce simply by a state's declaration 
of an epidemic, there would be no meaningful restriction on the state's police 
power until Congress legislated a limit. 
Plaintiffs argued that since the ship had a clean bill of health, the state's action 
constituted a taking without due process. The Court rejected this view, holding 
instead that it should "look into the operation and effect of the statute to discern 
its purpose."" The Court did not talk in modern terms about levels of scrutiny, 
but recognized that since interstate and international commerce were involved, 
the review would be more critical than our modern rational relationship test. 
Looking into the operation of the statute and its intent, the Court found that it was 
reasonable for the state to limit the entry of uninfected persons into a quarantined 
area. It accepted the state's argument that this would increase the number of persons 
who might be infected, and that some of these persons, coming from areas without 
yellow fever, might be more susceptible to the disease. The Court thus relied on the 
expertise of the state health department in determining the best way to manage the 
epidemic. This deference to expertise became a core part of public health jurispru-
dence and an underlying principle of modem administrative law. Having decided 
49. Id. at 388-89. 
50. Id. at 391 (emphasis in original). 
51. Id. at 392. 
96 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAw & POLICY [Vol. 11:83 
that the state's action was a proper limitation on commerce, the Court found that as 
long as it was being uniformly applied, it could be used to restrict international as 
well as interstate commerce. It thus dismissed the plaintiff's claims. 
The dissenters in CompagnieFrangaise,including Justice Harlan, were unwill-
ing to defer to the expertise of the state health department. Instead, they engaged 
in their own analysis of the effectiveness of the cordon sanitairein managing the 
epidemic. They found that it was merely speculative to assume that reducing the 
number of persons who might be infected within the quarantine area could help 
control the epidemic. This rejection of the expertise of the agency is reflected in 
modern calls to limit Chevron deference, and is echoed in contemporary court 
decisions that reject public health directives during the COVID-19 outbreak. 
VII. THE VACCINE CASES 
Jacobsonv. Massachusetts, the 1905 Supreme Court decision on mandatory 
vaccinations, is the public health law case best known to COVID-19 courts and 
commentators.5 During the first phase of the current pandemic, Jacobson was 
stretched to address legal issues arising from quarantines and business restrictions 
that are better understood by reference to other cases discussed in this essay. It 
will be a critical case for the second phase of the pandemic, when COVID-19 
vaccinations become part of the control strategy. 
Jacobsonwas a response to the anti-vaccine movement of its day. It is impor-
tant now in part because the prospect of mandatory COVID-19 vaccinations has 
activated the anti-vaccination movement anew, raising the possibility that a large 
enough percentage of the population might not be inoculated to effectively stop 
the spread of the disease. 
To understand Jacobson,we must go back to the beginnings of vaccinations in 
the United States, although until the 1930s, the only vaccine subject to general 
mandates was smallpox vaccine. And the key legal precedents all involve chal-
lenges to smallpox vaccination laws.53 
In the late eighteenth century, the English physician Edward Jenner observed 
that dairymaids who had been infected with cowpox, a mild pustular infection, 
thereafter were immune to smallpox.54 In 1796, Jenner famously inoculated a 
young man with cowpox, and the boy developed smallpox immunity.55 His find-
ing led to widespread inoculation with cowpox starting in the nineteenth century. 
The effectiveness of smallpox vaccination and the fear of smallpox epidemics 
soon led states to adopt mandatory vaccination laws. 56 
52. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
53. Charles L Jackson, State Laws on Compulsory Immunization in the United States, 84 PUB. 
HEALTH REP. 787, 788 (1969). 
54. EDWARD JENNER, THREE ORIGINAL PUBLICATIONS ON VACCINATION AGAINST SMALLPOX (1798), 
https://perma.cc/56XX-BH5F. 
55. Id. at 258. 
56. See Allegany County Comm'rs v. McClintock, 60 Md. 559 (1883); City of Ft. Wayne v. 
Rosenthal, 75 Ind. 156 (1881); Schmidt v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Stearns Co., 24 N.W. 358 (Minn. 
1885); Scripps v. Foster, 3 N.W. 216 (Mich. 1879); McIntire v. Town of Pembroke, 53 N.H. 462 (1873); 
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These laws were resisted from the beginning." People argued that they should 
not be vaccinated without their permission, but their claims were rejected by 
courts in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Medical autonomy, which is now a 
core ethical and legal principle, was not highly valued by the courts until after 
adoption of the Nuremberg Code following World War II.58 
Claims based on the dangers of the vaccine were more persuasive. While con-
temporary vaccines are very safe, smallpox vaccine in the 19th and early 20th 
century was not. It was prepared using an unsanitary method that contaminated 
the vaccine with dangerous bacteria that could and did lead to sepsis and death. 
The live virus in the vaccine, while not smallpox, could cause serious or fatal ill-
ness in persons with weakened immune systems. The public and the courts were 
aware that vaccination carried real risks. 
There was also anti-scientific argument that the vaccine did not prevent small-
pox or might even cause smallpox. As with contemporary denials of science, 
there were experts prepared to testify that vaccination was useless. 
Yet despite the real dangers of the vaccine and the false claims that it was use-
less, most of the public and the politicians supported mandatory vaccination 
laws. While it is hard to imagine contemporary politicians mandating a dangerous 
vaccine, times then were different. In the 1800s, smallpox was still present, and 
most of the public had seen its terrifying consequences. 
In Jacobson, the statute at issue provided a criminal fine for those who refused 
to be vaccinated. Reverend Jacobson refused to be vaccinated and was prose-
cuted. 59 He was found guilty, and appealed to the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court, which upheld the conviction.60 In an appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
Court, Jacobson argued that compulsory vaccination violated the Preamble to the 
United States Constitution and the spirit of the Constitution.61 
The Supreme Court started with a traditional police power analysis.6 2 It stated 
that it was appropriate for the Massachusetts legislature to refer the issue of what 
is necessary for the public health and safety to the Board of Health, and under the 
circumstances it would not adjudge the Board's vaccination requirement 
63 unnecessary. 
We are not prepared to hold that a minority, residing or remaining in any city 
or town where smallpox is prevalent, and enjoying the general protection 
afforded by an organized local government, may thus defy the will of its 
Com. v. Pear, 66 N.E. 719 (Mass. 1903), aff d sub nom. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); 
Carr v. Bd. of Educ. of Columbus, 1 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 602 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1903). 
57. See MILTON W. TAYLOR, VIRUSES AND MAN: A HISTORY OF INTERACTIONS 1, 8 (2014). 
58. See "Permissible Medical Experiments" in 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE 
NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw NO. 10, at 181-82 (1949). 
59. Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 13. 
60. Id. at 21. 
61. Id. at 22. 
62. Id. at 24. 
63. Id. at 27. 
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constituted authorities, acting in good faith for all, under the legislative sanc-
tion of the state.64 
A core issue in Jacobsonwas whether Reverend Jacobson would be allowed to 
present evidence opposing the scientific basis of the mandatory vaccine law, 
thereby asking the Court to substitute its assessment of the risk and necessity of 
mandatory smallpox vaccinations for that of the Board of Health.65 (Although the 
Court's discussion focused on the legislature's power, this power was actually 
delegated to and exercised by the Board; the statute was not self-executing. 66) 
The Court rejected the collateral attack on the legislative findings and the deci-
sion by the Board. 67 The Jacobson standard was later articulated in Williams v. 
Mayor of Baltimore, in what has become a standard formulation for judicial 
review of public health decisions: 
It is not the function of a court to determine whether the public policy that finds 
expression in legislation of this order is well or ill conceived. The judicial 
function is exhausted with the discovery that the relation between means and 
end is not wholly vain and fanciful, an illusory pretense. Within the field where 
men of reason may reasonably differ, the legislature must have its way.68 
Jacobson specifically endorsed the legislation's grant of discretion to the 
Board of Health to tailor the requirements of the law to prevent the potential 
injustice of applying a perfectly equal law to a population with differing needs. 
The Court pointed out that "[t]he legislature assumed that some children .. . 
might not be fit subjects of vaccination, and it is suggested-and we will not say 
without reason-that such is the case with some adults.'' 69 The Court also noted 
that the agency had the discretion to apply the law only when the community was 
threatened with smallpox. It found that it would work an injustice, and call into 
question the validity of the law, if it were applied without regard for the needs of 
individuals and the community.70 Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, noted that 
Jacobson never had offered to prove that he himself was not a fit subject of vacci-
nation.7 1 The opinion went on to state that to exempt the defendant because the 
vaccine often injured people who were deemed fit to be vaccinated 
64. Id. at 37. 
65. Id. at 23-24. 
66. Id. at 27. The Revised Laws of that commonwealth, c. 75, §137, provide that "the board of health 
of a city or town if, in its opinion, it is necessary for the public health or safety shall require and enforce 
the vaccination and revaccination of all the inhabitants thereof and shall provide them with the means of 
free vaccination. Whoever, being over twenty-one years of age and not under guardianship, refuses or 
neglects to comply with such requirement shall forfeit $5." Id. at 12. 
67. Id. at 30-31. 
68. 289 U.S. 36,42 (1933) (citations omitted). 
69. Jacobsen, 197 U.S. at 36. 
70. Id. at 20. 
71. Id. at 36-37. 
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would mean that compulsory vaccination could not in any conceivable case be 
legally enforced in a community, even at the command of the legislature, how-
ever widespread the epidemic of smallpox, and however deep and universal 
was the belief of the community and of its medical advisers, that a system of 
general vaccination was vital to the safety of all.72 
While vaccination laws for school entry were not at issue in Jacobson, the 
Court noted their existence and cited state court decisions upholding them. The 
Court reviewed the constitutionality of such laws in the 1922 case of Zucht v. 
King.73 There the plaintiff was excluded from school under a municipal ordinance 
requiring proof of smallpox vaccination for school entry. She argued that on its 
face the ordinance violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and that, as applied, it denied her the equal protection of 
the laws. Citing Jacobson,the Court ruled that the ordinance was a valid exercise 
of the police power. Finding no evidence that the ordinance was applied in a dis-
criminatory way, the Court dismissed the claim. 
The Court has not directly ruled on whether there is a constitutional right to a 
religious exemption to vaccination laws, but it raised the issue in 1944 in dicta in 
Princev. Massachusetts:7 4 
Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens 
patriaemay restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regu-
lating or prohibiting the child's labor, and in many other ways. Its authority is 
not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's 
course of conduct on religion or conscience. Thus, he cannot claim freedom 
from compulsory vaccination for the child more than for himself on religious 
grounds. The right to practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose 
the community or the child to communicable disease or the latter to ill health 
or death.75 
While it did not generate any police power case law, the swine flu vaccination 
campaign of 1976 illustrates the political costs of a failed vaccine program. The 
swine flu scare started in January of 1976 with a respiratory illness among several 
new recruits at Fort Dix, New Jersey. When samples were sent to the CDC labs, a 
previously unidentified strain of swine flu was detected. 76 The 1976 strain of 
swine flu resembled the strain that caused the great Spanish Influenza pandemic 
of 1918-1919. CDC feared that the country faced a deadly national flu pandemic 
72. Id. at 37. 
73. 260 U.S. 174 (1922). 
74. 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
75. Id. at 166-67. 
76. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT & HARVEY V. FINEBERG, THE SWINE FLU AFFAIR: DECISION-MAKING ON 
A SLIPPERY DISEASE (1978), https://perma.cc/7ADM-AXYY. 
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during the next flu season.77 It urged the White House to implement a nationwide 
emergency vaccination program. 
President Ford and Congress went on a war footing to get the vaccine devel-
oped and to establish a national immunization program. The vaccine was rolled 
out in record time, and the nation began to be vaccinated. The vaccination pro-
gram became a public relations nightmare when a serious neurologic disease was 
thought to be associated with the vaccine.78 When the expected swine flu out-
break then did not materialize, the public saw the CDC and the White House as 
having poisoned them with a bad vaccine for no reason. The ensuing scandal dis-
credited public health authorities and undermined political support for strong 
public health actions. 79 The long shadow of this failed effort likely heightened 
conservative politicians' skepticism of the CDC and flu experts at the beginning 
of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Jacobson and the related state and federal mandatory vaccination cases are 
based on the state's police powers. The vaccination laws in these cases, most of 
which relate specifically to smallpox, are justified by a state's power to protect its 
residents from epidemic disease. The objective of the laws is to have enough of 
the state's residents vaccinated, and thus immune to the disease, that when an 
infected person encounters another person, the probability is that the second per-
son will be immune and will not catch the disease. When all of an infected per-
son's contacts are immune, there will be no further transmission. Likewise, if
new cases enter the community, others will not be infected. Thus, the epidemic 
will be halted. 
It is not necessary that everyone in a community be immune to stop the spread 
of a disease. The percentage of the population that must be immune-vaccinated 
or recovered from the disease-varies with the disease and the vaccine. This is 
critical, because some people are not medically fit to be vaccinated, either 
because the vaccine will injure them or because it will not work on them. But 
when enough members of a community are immune to stop the spread of the dis-
ease, the community has reached "herd immunity." Mandating vaccinations to 
achieve herd immunity is a clear exercise of police power that balances the risk 
of individual injury against the good of the community. 
While modern vaccines are much safer than smallpox vaccine, many of them, 
especially the flu vaccine, are less effective than smallpox vaccine. They do not 
prevent all cases of the flu, although they often reduce the severity of the infection 
when a vaccinated person catches the flu. The best scientific evidence in June 
2020 is that the COVID-19 vaccine will be like flu vaccines and will be only par-
tially effective. The percentage of the population that must be vaccinated to reach 
herd immunity is thus higher when the vaccine is less effective. 
77. Id. at 5-9. 
78. Unthank v. United States, 732 F.2d 1517, 1518-19 (10th Cir. 1984); NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, 
supranote 76, at 97-98. 
79. See NEUSTADT & FINEBERG, supranote 76, at 2-3. 
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People may be less motivated to seek out a less effective vaccine, and anti-
vaccination groups may have an easier time eroding public trust when the vaccine 
cannot guarantee that an inoculated person will not get the disease. Once a vac-
cine becomes available, mandatory vaccination laws will therefore be essential in 
getting to herd immunity. But we can expect these new laws to prompt judicial 
review of the police power standards outlined above. 
VIII. PERSONAL PUBLIC HEALTH RESTRICTIONS 
The Supreme Court has not ruled on mandatory communicable disease treat-
ment, quarantine, or testing. The authority to carry out these actions is implicit in 
Jacobson, however, and there is a body of state cases upholding individual 
restrictions. 
Because there was no vaccine, test, or effective treatment for the Spanish 
Influenza of the 1918-1919 pandemic, it did not produce judicial challenges to 
testing or treatment. 
Tuberculosis does provide some useful legal guidance. Tuberculosis is a slow 
moving, relentless disease. While it is relatively hard to catch, it is difficult to 
treat today, and it was impossible to treat effectively until the 1950s. It can debili-
tate those it infects and can linger for years before killing its host. In 1915 there 
were more than 100,000 tuberculosis deaths per year in the United States, out of a 
population of only 100,000,000, and it killed year after year. It was called the 
"white plague." Globally, it is still a major killer. 80 As with COVID-19, a signifi-
cant number of persons infected with tuberculosis are carriers, that is, they have 
either no or minor symptoms but can spread the disease to others. A tuberculosis 
carrier can spread the disease for years, so it is critical to identify carriers. 
In State v. Armstrong, a Christian Scientist wanted to register as a university 
student in Washington State. 81 The state university required all students to have a 
chest x-ray for tuberculosis diagnosis, a common requirement at that time. 
Armstrong refused the x-ray because it was against her religion. The court held 
that personal religious beliefs must be subordinated to the protection of the public 
health, and that requiring tuberculosis testing for school entry was a legitimate 
82use of public health power. 
Testing for tuberculosis could have serious practical consequences. If the stu-
dent in Armstrong had tested positive, she would have been excluded from the 
university. The test result would have been reported to the local health depart-
ment, which would then have investigated the case. The health department would 
have made sure that she received treatment for tuberculosis, and she would have 
been isolated until the treatment rendered her non-infectious. If she had refused 
treatment, or the health officer had determined that she could self-quarantine, a 
80. See Thomas M Daniel, The History of Tuberculosis, 100 RESPIRATORY MED. 1862 (2006). 
81. 239 P.2d 545 (Wash. 1952). 
82. Id. at 549. 
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confinement order would have been issued, and she would have been put in isola-
tion in a locked quarantine facility. 
The petitioner in In re Halko was confined in a state hospital because he was 
infected with contagious tuberculosis. 83 He requested habeas corpus review of his 
confinement. 84 The court found the detention to be a lawful exercise of the public 
health power, but ruled that the state must periodically review detention orders to 
make sure that the medical basis for each order is still valid. 85 
While a judicial hearing is not always required prior to detention, habeas cor-
pus review is always available for detainees, at least for those taken into custody 
and held inside the United States.86 Many states have amended their public health 
laws to require pre-detention hearings, and a few state courts have found pre-
detention hearings to be required under the state or federal constitution. Once in 
detention, states are reluctant to force treatment on mentally competent patients, 
but most persons accept treatment because they will not be released until they 
become non-infectious. In some cases, treatment fails and the person must remain 
under restrictions until death. 
There appears to be only one modern case dealing with mandatory treatment 
for a disease other than tuberculosis. Reynolds v. McNichols reviewed a Denver 
municipal regulation requiring that prostitutes who were arrested be held until 
they were either tested or given antibiotic treatment for gonorrhea, based on their 
known high risk of infection. 87 Petitioner claimed invasion of privacy and a viola-
tion of equal protection based on the requirement that prostitutes be detained, but 
not their clients. 88 The Tenth Circuit rejected those claims, finding that the city's 
"hold and treat" orders were a valid exercise of the police power, and that detain-
ing only prostitutes, who were at much higher risk of infection than their clients, 
was a rational response to the problem of the gonorrhea epidemic. 89 
IX. PUBLIC NUISANCES 
One of the most important police powers is the power to abate public nuisan-
ces. Environmental threats to health and safety include garbage that harbors ver-
min, contaminated food, and dangerous buildings. Modern environmental law is 
rooted in public nuisance law. The orders to close businesses to prevent the 
spread of COVID-19 are based on the public nuisance power. The orders closing 
bars, and political opposition to those orders, have a parallel in the controversy 
over closing the gay bathhouses in the 1970s and 1980s. 
83. In re Halko, 246 Cal. App. 2d 533 (Ct. App. 1966). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 559. 
86. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 736-746 (2008) (describing the history and effect of the 
Suspension Clause). 
87. 488 F.2d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir. 1973). 
88. Id. at 1383. 
89. Id.; see also Edward P. Richards & Katharine C. Rathbun, The Role of the PolicePower in 21st 
Century Public Health, 26 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 350, 352-54 (1999) (discussing the 
Denver program). 
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In the 1970s, a massive epidemic of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) 
erupted in gay bathhouses in most large American cities.90 These included 
the treatable STIs, including syphilis, gonorrhea, and chlamydia. Public 
health departments developed STI outreach programs to serve the gay com-
munity. 91 These programs found that hepatitis b, a then poorly understood 
liver disease, was also being transmitted as an STI among gay men. 92 
Hepatitis b is a serious liver disease with significant long-term mortality from 
liver cancer. It remains incurable, but in the 1970s it was untreatable, and it 
would be several years before a vaccine became available. In addition to 
screening and treatment for the traditional STIs, outreach programs provided 
education and information on disease prevention. 93 These efforts did not 
reduce the STIs. 94 
The government failed gay men and the larger community by not closing the 
bathhouses in the late 1970s. This came shortly after the failure of the Swine Flu 
immunization campaign. By this time there were published data linking the high 
frequency anonymous exual activity facilitated by the bathhouses to the spread 
of hepatitis b. Based on what was known at the time, closing the bathhouses 
would have had two effects. It would have slowed the transmission of STIs, most 
importantly hepatitis b. It would also have had an important expressive effect of 
saying that it was dangerous for gay men to engage in the unsafe behaviors facili-
tated by the bathhouses. While it was not known at the time, this was the period 
when HIV began to circulate in the United States. 95 HIV has a slow onset, and the 
symptoms were confused with other diseases, delaying the identification of the 
first case until 1981.96 It was not until 1983 that the CDC published guidance on 
the methods of spread of HIV. 97 Had the bathhouses been closed in the late 
1970s, many fewer gay men would have been i fected before the HIV epidemic 
was recognized. 
There were no efforts to close the bathhouses until 1984. While the CDC was 
actively investigating the epidemiology and virology of HIV during this period, 
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93. David G. Ostrow & Dale M. Shaskey, The Experience of the Howard Brown Memorial Clinic of 
Chicago with Sexually Transmitted Diseases, 4 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES 53-55 (1977). 
94. Frederick C. Wolf & Franklyn N. Judson, Intensive Screening for Gonorrhea, Syphilis, and 
Hepatitis B in a Gay Bathhouse Does Not Lower the Prevalence ofInfection, 7 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED 
DISEASES 49-52 (1980). 
95. M. Thomas P. Gilbert et al., The Emergence ofHIV/AIDS in the Americas and Beyond, 104 PROC. 
NATL. ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. (Nov. 20, 2007). 
96. Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 250-
52(1981). 
97. Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS): Precautionsfor Health-CareWorkers andAllied 
Professionals,MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 450-51 (1983). 
104 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAw & POLICY [Vol. 11:83 
the Reagan administration was otherwise ignoring the HIV epidemic. The 
National Academy of Sciences "identified as a major concern a lack of cohesive-
ness and strategic planning throughout the national effort." 98 The push to close 
the bathhouses did not come from the CDC, but from city health deparments. The 
New York City Health Department sought a permanent injunction to close the 
bathhouses in New York City. 99 The injunction in City of New York v. New St. 
Mark's Baths was based on a New York statute that made a person guilty of a 
criminal nuisance when: 
1. By conduct either unlawful in itself or unreasonable under all the 
circumstances, he knowingly or recklessly creates or maintains a 
condition which endangers the safety or health of a considerable 
number of persons; or 
2. He knowingly conducts or maintains any premises, place or resort 
where persons gather for purposes of engaging in unlawful conduct.100 
Bathhouse owners attempted to present expert testimony to contest the ration-
ale for closing the bathhouses. Their argument was that it was better to use bath-
houses as places to do public health education than to close them.10 1 Citing 
Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, which was based on the analysis in Jacobson, 
the court in New St. Mark's Baths held that as long as the state's actions had a 
rational relationship to the state's objectives, the regulated parties could not use 
the courts to attack the agency's policy decisions and expert analysis unless the 
agency had acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.1 2 
CONCLUSION 
The states exercised broad powers over public health and safety-the police 
powers-during the colonial period. They retained those powers under the 
Articles of Confederation and the Constitution. The federal courts, under guid-
ance from the Supreme Court, have largely left those state police powers intact 
when they are used for legitimate public health purposes. The Civil Rights Acts 
and Supreme Court precedent have made it clear that the states cannot use those 
powers in a discriminatory manner, however. 
While the courts have put few limitations on public health powers, public offi-
cials have always been subject to political limitations. When fear is great, the 
public supports intrusive public health actions. When the fear wanes, either 
because the disease has been controlled or because the public has normalized the 
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Care, andResearch 32 (1986). 
99. City of New York v. New St. Mark's Baths, 497 N.Y.S. 2d 979 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986) (permanent 
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toll of the disease, support wanes and officials hesitate to employ the police 
103powers. 
During the COVID-19 pandemic we have seen the usual reluctance among 
some citizens to accept public health restrictions. What is unusual is that some 
courts have also been willing to ignore the lessons of Jacobsonand other classic 
police power cases and substitute their own judgment for that of public officials. 
When the pandemic is over and the appeals are done, it will be interesting to see 
what has survived of the traditional police powers. 
103. Milton J. Rosenau, The Uses ofFear in Preventive Medicine, 162 BOSTON MED. & SURG. J. 305 
(1910). 
